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Fighting Income Tax Evasion with Positive Rewards: 
Experimental Evidence 
 
1  Introduction  
Sun and Wind once had a fierce argument over who would be the more powerful. As they 
were arguing, they saw a man walking on a secluded road wearing a hat and a coat. It so 
happened that they agreed to demonstrate their powers to each other by convincing the said 
man to take off his hat and coat. Immediately the Wind started blowing toward the man. 
However, once the man realized that the Wind was blowing, he pressed his hat a bit stronger 
to his head and tightened his coat. So the Wind blew a bit harder. But the harder the Wind 
blew, the more the man pressed his hat to his head and tightened his grip on the coat. Finally, 
the Wind had no choice but to concede that he could not convince the man to take off his hat 
and coat. Then, when the Sun took its turn she smiled to the man and sent her warm rays to 
him. As the Sun was shining and the man felt the warm rays of the Sun he decided trying to 
do without his hat. The Sun continued to smile and shine and the man, being happy with 
wearing no hat, finally decided to take off his coat as well. 
The problem of tax evasion is usually approached in a ‘Wind’ fashion, that is, tax evasion 
is fought with negative sanctions such as fines or even imprisonment for non-honest taxpayers 
(e.g. see Allingham and Sandmo 1972). However, success of these measures has been rather 
limited (e.g. see Schneider and Enste 2000; Frey and Jegen 2001; Christie and Holzner 2006; 
Pickhardt and Sarda 2006). To this extent, the Sun-and-Wind fable motivates the general idea 
of the present paper: Does the additional option of giving positive rewards to honest taxpayers 
allow for designing a mechanism that eliminates or at least significantly reduces tax evasion? 
In fact, the purpose of this paper is to develop such a mechanism and to test run it in an 
experimental setting.    3 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides some background on tax evasion 
and positive rewards. Section three introduces the experimental design. Section four deals 
with strategy issues, section five provides experimental results and the final section offers 
policy recommendations and concludes.  
 
2  Background 
Following Gary S. Becker’s (1968) work on the economics of crime and Arrow’s (1970) work 
on optimal portfolio analysis under uncertainty, Allingham and Sandmo (1972) developed the 
first model of rational, utility maximizing taxpayers making their decisions under uncertainty. 
They conclude that an increase in deterrence parameters, e.g. probability of detection and 
level of the penalty on undeclared income, will c. p. always lead to an increase in actually 
declared income. Yet, the theoretical analysis of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) has been 
criticized on the grounds that their findings are not in line with empirical evidence on income 
tax compliance. For example, based on real values of taxation and deterrence parameters, 
Alm,  McClelland  and  Schulze  (1992,  p.  22),  argue  that  individuals  pay  more  taxes  than 
expected utility theory suggests.
1 They conclude that some other factors inevitably influence 
income tax behavior. Such factors are discussed, for example, as ‘appellation of informal 
penalties’ (e.g. see Hasseldine and Kaplan 1992; Violette 1989), and ‘positive strategies or 
appeals  to  conscience’  (e.g.  see  Slemrod,  Blumenthal  and  Christian  2001;  Blumenthal, 
Christian and Slemrod 2001; Hasseldine and Bebbington 1991). In fact, a large fraction of 
relevant literature is devoted to the question of why people pay taxes. As a consequence 
reciprocity, characteristics of the tax exchange, legitimacy and respect between taxpayers and 
tax authorities, moral or a sense of civic duty  are  considered  as important aspects in tax 
                                                 
1 Assuming that individuals have a low relative risk aversion, they conclude that less than 14% of actual incomes 
should be declared. In fact, risk aversion has to be increased to extreme values to end up with more realistic 
figures of 70% to 90% of income declared. 
   4 
compliance level explanations (e.g. Feld and Frey 2002, 2003, 2007; Andreoni, Erard and 
Feinstein 1998). Bazart (2000, 2002) provides a comprehensive overview concerning relevant 
literature, Torgler (2002) surveys the literature on experiments dealing with tax moral and tax 
compliance and Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002) offer a more general overview regarding tax 
avoidance, tax evasion and tax administration.  
Positive  incentives  for  honest  taxpayers  are  a  comparatively  new  issue.  In  the  early 
nineties,  Falkinger  and  Walther  (1991)  introduced  positive  rewards  as  a  complementary 
measure  besides  traditional  deterrent  measures.  They  show  that  the  combination  of  the 
deterrent system (i.e., a penalty on evaded tax) with a pecuniary reward (i.e., a reward per 
dollar of paid taxes) is welfare improving in comparison with a pure deterrent system as 
described in Allingham and Sandmo (1972). One can also find early attempts to give a role to 
positive  rewards  in  some  studies  focusing  on  optimal  taxation  design  such  as  the  ones 
developed by Mookerjee and Png (1989), Cremer and Gahvari (1996), Chandar and Wilde 
(1998),  and  Boadway  and  Sato  (2000).  The  aforementioned  theoretical  works  have  been 
complemented by empirical research. Some studies have focused on the impacts of rewards 
compared  to  punishment  in  cooperation  issues  (e.g.  see  Andreoni,  Harbaugh,  Vesterlund 
2003; Halloran and Walker 2004); some focused directly on the tax evasion problem.  
Regarding the tax evasion problem, positive rewards were first tested experimentally by 
Alm, Jackson, McKee (1992), who allowed for different reward schemes. Honest taxpayers 
could then either participate in a lottery scheme or, alternatively, could receive a fixed lump 
sum reward. Their conclusion confirmed the efficiency of positive incentives on taxpayers’ 
tax compliance and underlines the efficiency advantage of the lottery scheme in ensuring 
honest  reporting.  Moreover,  Torgler  (2003)  provided  an  experimental  test  of  the  relative 
impact of various factors (fiscal exchange, moral suasion, etc.), including positive rewards, on 
tax compliance. This field experiment was conducted in Costa Rica with taxpayers having 
different professions. The highest rate of tax compliance was achieved, in this experiment,   5 
under  the  positive  reward  scheme.  It  is  worth  noting,  however,  that  the  analysis  of  tax 
compliance regarding the control variable ‘gender’ did not show any considerable difference 
between male and female subjects. In contrast, the results presented in section 5 do indicate 
gender effects.  
More  recently,  Feld  and  Frey  (2007)  have  described  the  characteristics  of  the 
psychological tax contract existing between taxpayers and tax authorities and emphasized the 
need for a joint use of negative and positive incentives. Crowding theory (see Frey 1997) 
already justifies the use of a well designed combination of negative and positive incentives 
with the heterogeneity of taxpayers’ types and motivations.
2 The theory assumes that any 
external action, positive reward  and/or deterrence, can undermine or negatively  affect the 
intrinsic motivation of the taxpayer to pay his taxes if they are perceived to be intrusive. The 
issue is then to design a mechanism that will be perceived as supportive and that would then 
raise intrinsic motivation and, as a consequence, lead to more tax compliance. 
Thus, in line with the benefit principle of taxation, the tax exchange establishes a link 
between the taxpayers’ contributions and the governmental provision of public goods (see 
Pickhardt 2006, 2005b). To this extent, the provision of public goods may favor taxpayers’ 
honesty  and  Alm,  Jackson  and  McKee  (1992),  as  well  as  Alm,  McClelland  and  Schulze 
(1992)  provide  some  experimental  evidence  that  supports  this  view.  Yet,  although  the 
provision of public goods may be considered as a positive reward for taxpayers, it must be 
stressed that due to nonrivalness in consumption or the impossibility of applying the price-
exclusion principle, non-honest taxpayers may benefit from the provision of public goods in 
exactly the same way as honest taxpayers do. Therefore, it is worth analyzing the influence of 
                                                 
2 The heterogeneity of taxpayers’ types refers to the  fact  that the global population is  made of honest and 
dishonest  taxpayers.  Measures  described  in  the  seminal  work  of  Allingham  and  Sandmo  are  specifically 
designed to discourage dishonest taxpayers without considering the sub-population of honest taxpayers. Besides, 
being audited may have high psychological costs for an honest taxpayer and this is what Motivation Crowding 
Theory refers to.    6 
positive rewards that accrue exclusively to purely honest taxpayers and in a way that avoids 
any deviation from honest reporting due to social interaction (e.g. see Becker, Buchner and 
Sleeking 1987; Spicer and Becker 1980). 
In principle, the experimental design which we introduce in the next section follows these 
routes, but with some modifications.  
 
3  Experimental Design 
The next subsection gives a general overview of the design and the following subsection 
introduces procedure details and links the design to Allingham and Sandmo (1972) as well as 
to the design of Alm, Jackson and McKee (1992). 
 
3.1  General Aspects 
Sessions were conducted in a non-computerized ‘paper and pencil’ fashion at the Chemnitz 
University of Technology, Germany and at the University of Montpellier, France. A typical 
session lasted about 90 minutes. Subjects were drawn from first year students of the business 
administration  and  economics  faculty.  There  were  seven  subjects  per  session,  with  five 
subjects participating as ‘acting subjects’, one subject performing the role of the ‘institution’ 
and  another  subject  performing  the  role  of  the  ‘public  good  calculator’.  The  two  roles 
‘institution’ and ‘public good calculator’ were performed by subjects with a view to keep the 
process transparent and credible for the acting subjects.  
Each of the five acting subjects received an endowment or income of 100 tokens per 
round, i.e. W = 100, and was told that according to a generally accepted rule he or she is 
supposed to give up 20 of the 100 tokens in each round by submitting these 20 tokens to a 
third party called ‘institution’. But it was made clear in the instruction sheet that, in principle: 
(i) each subject may choose any integer from the integer interval [0, 20], (ii) compliance with 
the ‘give-20-rule’ is randomly audited by the institution and (iii) a penalty applies, if it is   7 
found that a subject has not acted according to the rule. In the first block of six rounds all 
voluntary tax payments to the institution plus enforced payments (reimbursement and penalty) 
due to an audit are pooled together according to a certain technology and paid back to the 
subjects as a public good. The second block of six rounds is then characterized by an increase 
in the detection or auditing rate. However, subjects can freely choose between this higher 
auditing rate and a lower auditing rate. To encourage opting for the higher auditing rate, there 
is a positive incentive in form of an individual lottery winning for purely honest taxpayers. 
Finally, the third block is characterized by an increase in the tax rate on undeclared income 
(i.e. the penalty rate). 
Regarding  monetary  incentives  each  subject  received  a  show-up  fee  of  five  Euro.  In 
addition, one of the five acting subjects was randomly selected at the end of the session and 
received one percent of his or her total earnings over the 18 rounds in cash. This total amount 
ranged  from  about  20  to  almost  30  Euro.  The  institution  and  the  public  good  calculator 
received another five Euro as compensation for not being able to participate in the one percent 
cash  scheme.  Monetary  incentives  were  mentioned  in  the  initial  instruction  sheet  and,  in 
addition, explained by the experimenter before the experiment started. 
  
3.2  Procedure  
After seating subjects conditions of anonymity were respected in all sessions. In addition, the 
‘institution’ and the ‘public good calculator’ were always visually separated from the five 
acting subjects, so that any kind of identification was impossible. Each acting subject received 
an instructions sheet, an earnings record sheet and a submission form (see appendix). The 
‘institution’ and the ‘public good calculator’ received the same instructions as the five acting 
subjects  and  some  additional  instructions  explaining  their  specific  role  and  job  in  the 
experiment,  they  also  received  specific  record  sheets.  All  subjects  were  told  to  read  the 
instructions  sheet  quietly.  When  everybody  had  finished  readings  the  experimenter   8 
summarized  the  instructions  orally  and  answered  questions.  The  experimenter  also  asked 
subjects  a  few  questions  to  check  whether  they  had  fully  understood  the  instructions. 
Thereafter, the  experimenter assigned an  ID-Number (1 to 5) to each  acting subject. The 
instruction sheet also informed subjects that three blocks of six rounds each would be played 
and that they would receive new instructions after each block. Again, at the beginning of each 
block questions were answered after each subject had finished readings. 
First Block: At the beginning of each round subjects choose the amount they wish to 
contribute to the ‘institution’ and simultaneously record this amount on their earnings record 
sheet and the submission form. Subjects are supposed to contribute 20 tokens of their income 
of 100 tokens, but may in principle choose  any  integer from the integer interval [0, 20]. 
Hence, the tax rate, θ, on declared income, X, is θ = 0.2. Yet, for simplicity we have chosen 
the amount of tax due, θX, as the actual decision variable, rather then X as in Allingham and 
Sandmo (1972). But as  θ is exogenously  given  and constant, the actual decision variable 
remains declared income, X, with θX = 20 implying X = W and θX = 0 implying X = 0.  
Subjects place their submission forms face down in front of them, with their ID-Number 
(1 to 5) written on the back of the form, and the experimenter collects these submission forms. 
Next,  the  ‘institution’  applies  its  auditing  scheme.  That  is,  the  subject  representing  the 
‘institution’ tosses a coin. If the coin shows tales no auditing takes place. However, if the coin 
shows its face value one card, in the first block, is drawn from a set of cards with numbers 1 
to  5,  which  are  taken  from  the  popular  UNO  card  game,  and  the  subject  with  the 
corresponding ID-Number is audited. Hence, each subject may be selected for auditing with 
the probability, ρ = 1/2 · 1/5 = 0.1. During an audit the institution learns the true income of the 
audited subject. If the institution finds that the subject has contributed less than 20 tokens, the 
tax rate on non-declared income, π = 0.3, is due. The institution records any amounts due on 
the relevant submission form and passes all forms on to the ‘public good calculator’.    9 
The subject representing the ‘public good calculator’ then calculates the public good payoff, 
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where the sum of Ci denotes the voluntarily declared contributions of all five subjects, R 
refers to the reimbursement of evaded tax, P is the penalty paid by the audited subject if found 
to be a tax evader, λ can be interpreted as an efficiency parameter and n is the number of 
acting  subjects.  The  calculation  procedure  in  (1)  represents  a  modified  version  of  the 
aggregation  technology  ‘average’  and  coincides  with  the  technology  ‘summation’  for  the 
special  case  of  n  =  λ  (see  Cornes  1993).  The  total  public  good  payoff  G  then  accrues 
simultaneously to all acting subjects according to (2): 
 
G = G1 = G2 = … = Gn ,    i = 1, 2, …, n.          (2) 
 
where Gi  refers to the public good payoff received by the i-th subject (see Samuelson 1954; 
Pickhardt 2006). Once G is calculated, the experimenter announces G by writing G on a board 
so that all acting subjects can record G on their earnings record sheet. Thereafter, the acting 
subjects calculate their total earnings of that round. The next round then starts in exactly the 
same way as the first round with the experimenter distributing a new submission form to each 
acting subject. After a total of six rounds the first block is completed.  
Second Block: In principle, the six rounds of the second block are run in much the same way 
as in the first block. The major difference is the introduction of a lottery scheme where lottery 
winnings serve as a positive reward for purely honest tax payers.    10 
In particular, we allow subjects to choose freely between a low value of ρ and a somewhat 
higher value of ρ. If they wish to choose a low value of ρ they need to join the ‘beta-group’, 
and if they wish to choose a somewhat higher value of ρ they need to join the ‘alpha-group’. 
Coins are therefore tossed separately for the two groups. The procedure for the beta-group is 
exactly the same as in the first block, that is, one card is drawn from a stack of UNO cards 
representing the ID’s or the beta-group members. However, if an audit takes place in the 
alpha-group, two cards from a stack of UNO cards representing the alpha-group members are 
drawn  and  the  submission  forms  of  the  corresponding  subjects  are  audited.  To  motivate 
subjects  to  join  the  alpha-group,  their  members  are  entitled  to  participate  in  the  lottery 
scheme. In particular, alpha-group subjects that are audited (i.e. either one or two) and are 
found to be in full compliance with the ‘give-20-rule’, that is Ci = θX = 20, are entitled to 
continue  with  participating  in  the  lottery  scheme.  If  both  audited  subjects  are  entitled  to 
continue, one card is drawn and the subject with the corresponding ID-Number wins a lottery 
payoff, L, of 72 tokens. Note, however, that according to (3) any lottery winning is deducted 
from total revenue and, therefore, actual lottery winnings will reduce the amount of the public 
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Yet, if there is no audit, there is no lottery and no member of the alpha-group receives the 
lottery payoff L. This procedure ensures that the lottery payoff, L, is paid to purely honest 
taxpayers only. Also, it is worth noting that the subjects in both the alpha- and the beta-group 
are no longer faced with a decision under risk, where the probability of auditing is known, but 
with a decision under uncertainty as in the real world. This is because the probability of 
auditing now depends on how many subjects join the alpha- or beta-group, so that with n = 5   11 
= na + nb, ρ-alpha is: 0.5 · (2/na) " na ³ 2 and 0.5 · (1/na) for na = 1, and thus can vary from 
0.2 to 0.5, whereas ρ-beta is:  0.5 · (1/nb) " nb, and can vary from 0.1 to 0.5.  
Third Block: The third block is run in much the same way as in the second block. The only 
difference  with  the  second  block  is  that  the  penalty  rate  is  increased  from  50  percent  of 
evaded tax to 100 percent of evaded tax, which amounts to a tax rate on undeclared income of 
π = 0.4.   
Finally, it may be worth noting that apart from differences in parameter values, our design 
differs in two aspects from that of Alm, Jackson and McKee (1992). First, in our design all 
subjects receive a fixed and equal income, whereas subject income is variable over a certain 
range in Alm, Jackson and McKee (1992). Second, in our lottery sessions the probabilities of 
auditing and lottery winnings are determined endogenously over a certain range, but are fixed 
in Alm, Jackson and McKee (1992).  
 
4  Strategies 
Our theoretical background is in line with Allingham  and Sandmo (1972) and Yitzhaki’s 
(1974)  extension  that  introduces  a  penalty  on  unpaid  taxes  in  contrast  to  Allingham  and 
Sandmo’s penalty on undeclared income.
3 In particular, we follow Allingham and Sandmo by 
using their notation and specify a Von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility function of the same 
kind, but with two differences. First, we use a linear utility function rather than a concave one. 
Second, following the design described in the preceding section, a public good is provided 
(see equation (4), third term) that benefits taxpayers and evaders alike. Thus, equation (4) 
represents the indirect expected utility, EU, of the risk neutral representative i-th subject in the 
experiment:  
                                                 
3 In the experiment we assume a tax rate of 0.2 q = . Now denote by s the sanction rate, with s = 0.5. Hence, any 
evader who is audited and detected has to pay:( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) . . i i i W X s W X s W X q q q q q q - + - = + - . Thus, 
( ) 0.3 s p q q = + = .   12 
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where ρ is the probability that the subject or taxpayer is audited by the institution or tax 
authorities, W is the exogenously given endowment or income which is known by the subject, 
but not by the institution, q  is the constant tax rate on declared income, X is the income 
actually declared by the subject and, as noted above, the subject’s actual decision variable, p 
is the constant tax rate on undeclared income, including: (i) reimbursement of evaded taxes 
(which corresponds to R in (1)), and (ii) penalty on unpaid taxes (which corresponds to P in 
(1)), and the index j denotes what the other four subjects in the group may contribute to the 
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Setting (5) equal to zero and rearranging yields:  
 
ρp =q  .                    (6) 
 
If condition (6) holds, any rational, expected utility maximizing subject is indifferent between 
tax compliance and tax evasion, but for, ρp >q  (6a), it will fully comply with its taxes and 
for, ρp < q  (6b), it will fully evade its taxes. Hence, the linear contribution environment of 
the experiment allows for corner solutions only. Also, despite the provision of a public good, 
with the given parameter values, rational, expected utility maximizing subjects will continue 
to fully evade taxes, because they are trapped in a prisoner’s dilemma in which the dominant   13 
strategy  is  not  to  contribute,  that  is,  declare  nothing  voluntarily  with  Xi  =  0.  Then,  with 
parameter values set at ρ = 0.1, q  = 0.2, p = 0.3, λ = 3, W = 100 and n = 5, it follows from (4) 
that the expected payoff in the first block is 106 tokens: 
 
  EUi = (0.9) (100) +  0.1(70) + [(3+ 12) · 3/5] = 106                      (7) 
 
where the public good contributions come from expected enforced payments due to audits. In 
the second and third block, the probability of an audit depends on whether the subject has 
joined the alpha- or beta-group and on how many other subjects have joined these groups. 
With  n  =  5  subjects,  six  alternative  subject  allocations  are  conceivable  and  the  expected 
payoff per subject and round must be calculated for each allocation and each group separately. 
Table 1 gives an overview with respect to the conceivable allocations in each of the three 
blocks.   
 
  *** Insert Table 1 about here*** 
 
Essentially, the expected payoff of a subject in the alpha-group, EUa, is calculated according 
to (8):  
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where na denotes the number of subjects in the alpha-group and j denotes the probability of 
either tossing a coin or drawing a card from a stack of two cards, with j = 0.5. Note, however,   14 
that the first term in (8) can be simplified if it is assumed that all subjects in the alpha-group 
declare their true income, with W = Xai. In general, this assumption can be made because any 
rational, payoff maximizing subject will join the alpha-group only if it is prepared to declare 
its true income for otherwise the subject cannot win the lottery and would be faced with a 
higher probability of an audit compared to the beta-group, as two cards rather than just one 
card are drawn from the alpha stack. Hence, for simplicity, the first term in (8) can be reduced 
to the certain payoff from declaring the true income. This is shown in (8a): 
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    with:  W = Xai " i, Xbj = 0  " j, and na ³ 2 
 
The second term in (8a) denotes the expected payoff from the public good. Within the squared 
bracket, the first term denotes the sum of voluntary tax payments from the alpha-group (which 
will be certain), the second term denotes the expected enforced tax payments (reimbursement 
and penalty) from the beta-group. The probability of the enforced tax payments is simply that 
of tossing the coin in the beta-group, because if there is an audit the audited subject will be a 
tax evader who has declared no income at all, with Xbj = 0. In fact, it can be assumed that only 
tax evaders will join the beta-group because any rational, payoff maximizing subject who is 
prepared to fully declare its true income will join the alpha-group and, for the given parameter 
values, any rational, payoff maximizing subject in the beta-group will choose to declare no 
income at all. Hence, there will be no voluntary tax payments from the beta-group. The third 
term  within  the  square  bracket  refers  to  the  lottery  payment  that  will  be  made  with  the 
probability of tossing the coin in the alpha-group, because the lottery wining L will be paid 
out whenever there is an audit in the alpha-group.   15 
Finally, the third term in (8a) denotes the expected payoff from the lottery, where the first j 
denotes  the  probability  of  an  audit  due  to  tossing  the  coin,  the  term  2/na  denotes  the 
probability that the i-th subject is drawn if two cards from the alpha stack are drawn, and the 
second j denotes the probability that the i-th subject’s ID is drawn from the stack of two 
cards  representing  the  ID’s  of  the  two  audited  subjects  participating  in  the  lottery.  Note, 
however, that (8a) is defined only for na ³ 2, because for na = 1 the second term is reduced to 
just: j ·L.  
The expected payoff of a subject in the beta-group is calculated according to (9):  
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where rb denotes the probability of an audit in the beta-group, with: j · 1/nb, which compares 
to ra = j · 2/na for the alpha-group in (8). For nb = 5 equation (9) corresponds to (4).  
Now  consider  Table  1  again.  For  example,  the  expected  payoff  of  allocation  A0B5, 
second block, where all five subjects are in the beta-group is exactly the same as in the first 
block. Also, in allocation A1B4, second block, where one subject is in the alpha-group and 
the remaining four are in the beta-group, expected net revenue of the government from the 
alpha-group members is: (1/2 · 20 + 1/2 · (20–72) =) –16 tokens, and from the beta-group: 
(1/2 · 0 + 1/2 · 30 =) 15 tokens. Thus, overall expected net revenue is –1 token and, therefore, 
no public good can be provided in allocation A1B4 of the second block (see Table 1). 
To  analyze  optimal  behavior  patterns  under  the  lottery  scheme,  we  first  consider  the 
second block, and suppose again that all subjects are in the beta-group, i.e., allocation A0B5. 
Each single subject has an incentive to join the alpha-group, if all others stay in the beta-
group, because with an expected payoff of 116 tokens (allocation A1B4), the subject joining   16 
the alpha-group would be better off. Yet, if all others also join the alpha-group each subject 
would be even better off with an expected payoff of 125.6 tokens (allocation A5B0, Table 1). 
Hence, if all subjects are in the beta-group (allocation A0B5), each subject has an incentive to 
join the alpha-group irrespectively of what the others do. Likewise, irrespectively of what the 
subject under consideration does, all others have an incentive to join the alpha-group (see 
Table 1). Moreover, if all subjects have joined the alpha-group no subject has an incentive to 
deviate and rejoin the beta-group or pursue a ‘black sheep’ strategy
4, because in both cases 
the expected payoff would be lower than in allocation A5B0, that is, 120.4 tokens (A4B1) or 
124 tokens (A4_1B0) for the ‘black sheep’ case (see Table 1 and Figure 1). Thus, allocation 
A5B0 represents a Pareto-optimal Nash-equilibrium, in which every subject fully contributes 
its taxes. 
Regarding this full contribution equilibrium the expected net revenue of the government 
would be 64 tokens per round and the forgone 36 tokens (j · L) due to the lottery could be 
interpreted as information rent which needs to be paid to subjects or taxpayers in exchange for 
revealing  their  private  information  concerning  their  taxable  income.  Hence,  for  the  given 
parameter constellation, any government that expects total income tax evasion in excess of 36 
tokens per round (i.e., on average 7.2 tokens per individual), for the given parameter values, 
could  benefit  from  the  introduction  of  the  lottery  scheme.  Moreover,  regarding  a  full 
contribution equilibrium it must be stressed that with the given parameter values, condition 
(6) indicates that a detection rate in excess of ρ = 0.66, or alternatively, a penalty rate in 
                                                 
4 The term ‘black sheep’ strategy refers to an allocation in which a tax evader joins the alpha-group. This 
allocation is denoted as A4_1B0, which means that there are five subjects in the alpha-group, four honest ones 
and a non-honest one. This may make sense on the grounds that the probability of detection is lower in the alpha-
group than in the beta-group. For example, in allocation A4B1 the probability of detection in the beta-group is ρ 
= 0.5, but just 0.2 if the subject joins the alpha-group as a ‘black sheep’. Payoffs associated with a ‘black sheep’ 
strategy are shown in Table 1 in italics. Also, it follows that for tax evaders the probability of auditing, ρ, 
actually varies only from 0.1 (for B5) to 0.25 (for B2) and is, therefore, not identical with the range of ρ-beta, i.e. 
0.1 to 0.5.    17 
excess of 1,000 percent of evaded tax, i.e. π > 2, would c.p. also establish a full contribution 
equilibrium. But establishing a full contribution equilibrium with just one parameter may not 
be cost efficient. In fact, the costs associated with ρ > 0.66 may be too high, or a penalty of 
more than 1,000 percent on evaded tax, π > 2, may be so high that it is not enforceable and, 
therefore, may not represent a real threat. Moreover, for psychological reasons individuals 
may  react  differently  to  each  parameter  variation  and,  therefore,  a  revenue  maximizing 
combination of the four instruments ‘penalty rate’, ‘detection rate’, ‘public good’ and ‘lottery 
scheme’ may exist where each instrument plays its role by assuming a non-zero value.  
In the third block, as noted, the penalty rate on evaded tax is raised from 50 percent to 100 
percent, and the tax rate on undeclared income is, therefore, π = 0.4. As shown in Table 1, the 
higher penalty rate increases the incentive of each single subject to join the alpha-group, but 
only at the margin. This is because the negative effect of the higher penalty on the expected 
payoff from full tax evasion is compensated to some extent by a higher public good payoff 
(see  Table  1).  This  effect  results  from  incorporating  the  revenue  of  the  penalty  into  the 
calculation procedure for the public good payoff according to (3). Hence, removing P from 
(3) would help a government to establish a full contribution equilibrium and, because no 
penalty would be paid once such equilibrium is established, no welfare loss would result from 
removing P from (3). In any case, it must be emphasized that the penalty increase does give 
an economic incentive to change the behavior pattern in the third block in comparison to that 
of the second block.   
To summarize, with parameter values specified as described above, rational and utility 
maximizing individuals would fully evade their taxes in the first block. In contrast, rational 
and utility maximizing individuals would have an incentive to fully pay their taxes in both the 
second and third block. This is because of the introduction of individual lottery winnings for 
purely honest taxpayers and because a public good is provided. More precisely, if a subject 
deviates from honestly declaring its true income, the increase in expected individual base   18 
payoff  does  not  compensate  the  decrease  in  expected  lottery  winnings  and  the  expected 
individual public good payoff. For example, consider Table 2, second block, allocation A5B0 
versus A4B1. With respect to the deviating subject, the increase in expected base payoff from 
80 to 85 tokens does not compensate the drop in expected lottery payoff from 7.2 to 0 tokens 
plus the drop in expected public good payoff from 38.4 to 35.4, as the net change in total 
expected payoff is -5.2 tokens.  
 
5  Results 
Results of a total of nine sessions are presented in Table 2. Five of these nine sessions were 
conducted in Chemnitz/Germany (C1 to C5) and four in Montpellier/France (M1 to M4). All 
results in Table 2 are denoted in tokens, except ‘M/F’ which denotes the number of males and 
females, respectively, ‘checked’ which denotes the number of audited subjects and ‘TC-Ratio’ 
which refers to the percentage share of full compliances (i.e., the nominator shows how often 
subjects have given 20 tokens). ‘Declared’ refers to the sum of all voluntary contributions, 
∑Ci = ∑θXi, actually made by the five acting subjects in the relevant block of six rounds, 
‘Enforced’ are taxes or reimbursements paid due to an audit, ‘P’ are penalties paid due to non-
compliance,  ‘Net  Rev.’  refers  to  total  net  revenue  collected  by  the  government  (that  is, 
declared  +  enforced  +  P)  with  figures  in  parenthesis  denoting  expected  net  revenue  and 
‘Payoff’ denotes the aggregate payoff of all subjects in a block of six rounds.  
 
***Insert Table 2 about here*** 
 
A Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank-sum test on the items ‘Declared’, ‘TC-Ratio’, Net Revenue’ 
and ‘Payoff’ shows that in most cases we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the figures are 
drawn from the same population. Exceptions are ‘Declared’, third block, where we can reject 
the null hypothesis at the ten percent level, ‘TC-Ratio’, first and third block, where the null   19 
hypothesis  is  rejected  at  the  ten  percent  and  five  percent  level,  respectively,  and  ‘Net 
Revenue’, third block, where the null is rejected at the ten percent level. However, if the 
relevant differences between blocks are considered for each of these four items, in all cases 
we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the figures are drawn from the same population. 
Hence, although there might be some differences regarding the impact of the penalty and with 
respect  to  full  compliance  behavior,  we  conclude  that  in  general  there  is  no  significant 
difference between subject behavior in Chemnitz and Montpellier, so that we can analyze all 
nine sessions jointly. 
 
First Block 
With respect to the first block it follows from Table 2, ‘Declared’, that the actual voluntary 
contribution  level  or  tax  compliance  level  is  substantially  higher  than  that  calculated  for 
rational, expected utility maximizing subjects in the preceding section, i.e., zero.
5 However, 
the ‘TC-Ratio’ shows that the level of full compliance is substantially lower. Further, the 
actual number of audits, i.e. 24, is sufficiently close to the expected value of 27. In other 
words, audits have generated additional revenue and, therefore, net revenue exceeds voluntary 
contributions (‘Declared’) in each case. Note, however, that in contrast to ‘Declared’, which 
may vary from 0 to 600 tokens, ‘Net Revenue’ may in principle vary from 0 to 660 tokens, 
where 660 tokens implies that there is always just one tax evader and this tax evader is always 
audited.  
 
Second and third block 
 First of all, it is worth noting that in none of the sessions the theoretically expected full 
contribution environment (i.e. ‘Declared’ = 600) has emerged, except for session M4, third 
                                                 
5 Yet, the contribution levels are by and large in line with results from public goods games in the laboratory or 
classroom (e.g. see Ledyard 1995 and Pickhardt 2005a), where subjects contribute 40 to 60 percent of their 
endowment voluntarily.    20 
block. This notwithstanding, a comparison of the ‘Declared’ figures in the second and third 
block with those in the first block demonstrates that the lottery scheme has a strong and 
positive influence on tax compliance (see Table 2). A Wilcoxon signed ranks test (see Table 
3)  shows  that  we  can  reject  the  null  hypothesis  of  no  difference  in  ‘Declared’  after 
implementation of the lottery scheme for both the Chemnitz and Montpellier subset at the ten 
percent level and for the joint set at least at the five percent level.  In  particular, we can 
conclude  that  voluntary  contributions  made  in  both  the  second  and  the  third  blocks  are 
significantly  higher  (one  percent  level)  than  in  the  first  block.  In  addition,  they  are  also 
significantly higher (five percent level) in the third block than in the second block.  
Essentially the same result holds true if we compare the TC-Ratios. Inspection of Table 3 
reveals that test results for the TC-Ratio, joint set, allow rejection of the null hypothesis in all 
cases at the one percent level. In comparison with the ‘Declared’ figures this indicates that the 
lottery  scheme  not  only  yields  a  higher  level  of  tax  compliance,  but  that  this  increase  is 
predominantly achieved by a much higher rate of full compliance. This further indicates that 
our  scheme  of  rewarding  only  purely  honest  taxpayers  does  work  with  respect  to  tax 
compliance. 
However,  although  in  some  cases  we  do  observe  that  our  scheme  yields  higher  net 
revenues and/or a higher payoff in either the second or third block (see Table 2), these results 
are statically not significant. In fact, in both cases we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no 
difference  (for  brevity  test  statistics  are  not  displayed).  Therefore,  we  conclude  that  the 
scheme neither increases net revenue for the government nor payoff for the subjects. Yet, at 
this point it must be emphasized that in sessions C5, M1 and M4 the net revenue of the first 
block already exceeds the expected revenue of 384 tokens in the second and third block. 
Therefore, in these sessions the scheme could not have worked because the level of initial tax 
compliance was too high. Likewise, in sessions C1, C3, and M2 net revenue of the first block 
is  fairly  close  to  the  expected  revenue  level  and,  thus,  even  under  extremely  favorable   21 
circumstances  the  scheme  could  have  worked  only  at  the  margin.  In  the  remaining  three 
sessions C2, C4 and M3 the scheme has worked with respected to net revenue and/or payoff, 
except where extremely unfavorable odds have prevented that (i.e. session C2, third block). 
To  put  it  differently,  the  scheme  has  neither  significantly  increased  net  revenue  for  the 
government nor payoff for the subjects because the initial rate of tax compliance was too high 
in most of the sessions.  
 
Gender 
To  test  for  possible  gender  effects  we  first  did  a  Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney  test  on  the 
individual ‘Declared’ results of all 45 subjects (not displayed here). Regarding the 16 male 
subjects, we find a p-value of 0.34 (see Siegel and Castellan 1985, Table J, for Wx = 64, m = 
7, n = 9) and, thus, cannot reject the null hypothesis that they  are drawn from the same 
population. Likewise, with respect to the 29 female subjects, we find a p-value of 0.28 (see 
Siegel and Castellan 1985, Table A, for Wx = 208, m = 13, n = 16). Hence, we can conclude 
that both males and females show the same behavior pattern in Chemnitz and in Montpellier 
and that we can, therefore, analyze them jointly. However, regarding males versus females, 
we find a p-value of 0.0008 (see Siegel and Castellan 1985, Table A, for Wx = 234.5, m = 16, 
n = 29). Thus, we can reject the null hypothesis at the one percent level and conclude that 
males  and  females  do  not  show  the  same  behavior  pattern.  Put  differently,  regarding  a 
subject’s voluntary tax compliance behavior it does not matter whether the subject is French 
or German, but it does matter whether the subject is male or female. In this context, it is worth 
noting that Alm and Torgler (2006), based on data from the World Values Survey, do find 
some differences in tax morale between taxpayers in France and Germany. However, the 
difference between France and Germany seems to be much smaller than differences between 
other European countries or between European countries and the USA (see Alm and Torgler, 
2006, p. 239).   22 
Moreover, gender specific results presented in Table 4 and results from a Wilcoxon signed 
ranks test in Table 5 show that the lottery scheme has a positive impact on tax compliance for 
both  female  and  male  taxpayers.  In  particular,  for  the  joint  set  we  can  reject  the  null 
hypothesis of no differences in each case at the one percent level and conclude that the lottery 
scheme has increased tax compliance for both males and females. The only exception is the 
difference between the third and second block. Regarding males we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis of no difference, but with respect to females we can reject the null hypothesis at 
the five percent level. Therefore, we conclude that the penalty increase had no impact on male 
behavior, but did influence the behavior of females to some extent. This supports the view 
expressed earlier on (see section 4) that individuals may react differently to instruments used 
for fighting tax evasion.  
Furthermore, results presented in Table 4, first block, support the finding of Spicer and 
Becker (1980, p. 174) that c.p. “males evade a greater percentage of their taxes than females” 
(see also Baldry 1987 for similar results). In fact, in the first block males contributed on 
average only 44 tokens per block, whereas females contributed on average 80 tokens per 
block.  Also,  inspection  of  the  TC-Ratios  shows  that  females  more  often  show  a  full 
compliance behavior than males do. In both case, essentially the same is true for both the 
Chemnitz and Montpellier subset.  
In addition, positive rewards in form of the lottery scheme had a much stronger impact on 
males than on females. Inspection of Table 4 shows that males have increased their average 
voluntary contribution from 44 tokens in the first block to 84 tokens in the second block and, 
thus, by factor 1.9. In contrast, females have increased their average voluntary contribution 
from 80 tokens in the first block to 96 tokens in the second block and, thus, just by factor 1.2. 
Comparing the third and the first block yields a similar result and also shows that males in 
France and in Germany have increased their voluntary contributions by almost the same factor 
of 2.2. This is also true for females, but at a lower rate of about 1.35. It is also worth noting   23 
that the gap between voluntary male and female contributions is substantially smaller in the 
third block as compared to the one described above for the first block (see Table 4). To this 
extent, the lottery scheme has generated a more uniform tax compliance behavior.  
Finally,  it  should  be  stressed  that  in  general  the  results  support  the  findings  of  Alm, 
Jackson  and  McKee  (1992)  with  respect  to  the  influence  of  positive  rewards  on  honest 
taxpayers. 
 
6  Policy Recommendations and Concluding Remarks  
In this paper we have tested a new experimental design for analyzing the impact of positive 
rewards on individual tax compliance. Important features of the design are that it applies for 
purely honest taxpayers only and that the probability of an audit is endogenously determined. 
To this extent, the design is close to a real world environment. Evidence from various sessions 
suggests  that  positive  rewards  in  form  of  individual  lottery  winnings  for  purely  honest 
taxpayers have a strong positive impact on tax compliance, as they pull potential tax evaders 
into the honest taxpayer domain. In addition, our results suggest that this positive impact on 
tax  compliance  is  particularly  strong  for  male  taxpayers.  Further,  our  results  confirm  the 
findings of others that male taxpayers evade a greater percentage of their taxes than females. 
Yet, it has been demonstrated in section four that the lottery scheme implies some costs (i.e. 
an information rent) and can, therefore, be revenue enhancing for the government only if the 
actual net revenue before the introduction of the lottery scheme is below a certain threshold 
(i.e., 384 tokens, see Table 2). The results presented in section five support this view.  
Taken together, our findings imply that the introduction of individual lottery winnings for 
purely honest taxpayers will be rather successful in terms of an overall revenue increase in 
economies with a low rate of tax compliance and a high share of male taxpayers. As such 
circumstances  may  predominantly  prevail  in  developing  countries,  introducing  individual 
lottery winnings for honest taxpayers might be a promising tax policy option for developing   24 
countries.  In  any  case,  results  shown  in  this  paper  and  in  previous  literature  on  positive 
rewards for honest taxpayers suggests that more research in this direction, including field 
experiments, should be done.    25 
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Expected Payoff for the ‘Black Sheep’ (A4_1) 
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Table 1: Expected Individual Payoffs per Round  and Block (in tokens) 
#1 Block                   
All Subjects           
  Base  PG  EP             
  97  9  106             
                   
#2 Block                   
Alpha-Group    Beta-Group 
No.  Base  PG  L  EP    No.  Base  PG  EP 
A0  -  -  -  -    B5  97  9  106 
A1  80  0  36  116    B4  96.25  0  96.25 
A2  80  11.4  18  109.4    B3  95  11.4  106.4 
A3  80  23.4  12  115.4    B2  92.5  23.4  115.9 
A4  80  35.4  9  124.4    B1  85  35.4  120.4 
A4_1  80  30  8.64  118.64    A_1  94  30  124 
A5  80  38.4  7.2  125.6    B0  -  -  - 
                   
#3 Block                   
Alpha-Group    Beta-Group 
No.  Base  PG  L  EP    No.  Base  PG  EP 
A0  -  -  -  -    B5  96  12  108 
A1  80  2.4  36  118.4    B4  95  2.4  97.4 
A2  80  14.4  18  112.4    B3  93.3  14.4  107.7 
A3  80  26.4  12  118.4    B2  90  26.4  116.4 
A4  80  38.4  9  127.4    B1  80  38.4  118.4 
A4_1  80  31.2  8.64  119.84    A_1  92  31.2  123.2 
A5  80  38.4  7.2  125.6    B0  -  -  - 
                   
Note: Base denotes the expected payoff base value, PG denotes the expected payoff from 
public good provision, L denotes the expected payoff from the lottery and EP denotes the total 
expected payoff per subject in tokens, i.e., Base + PG [+L]. No. denotes the allocation with A 
and B referring to the alpha- and beta-group, respectively, and the attached number denotes 
the number of subjects in either the alpha- or beta-group. A4_1 denotes the expected payoff of 
the four honest subjects when a ‘black sheep’ strategy is pursued with five subjects in the 
alpha-group, of which only four are honest and one is a tax evader (the ‘black sheep’). A_1 
denotes the expected payoff of the ‘black sheep’. 
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 Table 2: Results per Block and Session for Chemnitz and Montpellier (in tokens) 
 
     
                    Chemnitz     Montpellier  Average 
  C1  C2  C3  C4  C5  M1  M2  M3   M4  CA  MA  TA 
(M/F)  (2/3)  (2/3)  (2/3)  (3/2)  (0/5)  (2/3)  (1/4)  (3/2)  (1/4)  (9/16)  (7/13)  (16/29) 
                         
#1 Block                         
Declared  349  241  337  252  458  396  295  277  424  327  348  337 























34  30 
P (50%)  9  10  9.5  30  5  19.5  27  10.5  10  13  17  15 
Net Rev.  376  271  365.5  342  473  455  376  308.5  454  366  398  382 
  (90)  (90)  (90)  (90)  (90)  (90)  (90)  (90)  (90)  (90)  (90)  (90) 
Payoff  3706  3542  3729  3580  3941  3949  3682  3617  3940  3700  3797  3743 
 
#2 Block 
                       
Declared  410  532  495  420  374  440  469  404  587  446  475  461 






























25  15  20 
P (50%)  22  1.5  0  10  30  0  10  20  0  13  8  10 
(-)Lottery  72  144  216  144  216  72  144  216  144  187  144  166 
Net Rev.  404  392.5  279  306  248  368  354  248  443  297  353  325 
  (384)  (384)  (384)  (384)  (384)  (384)  (384)  (384)  (384)  (384)  (384)  (384) 
Payoff  3535  3791  3629  3611  3518  3706  3758  3586  3884  3617  3734  3669 
 
#3 Block 
                       
Declared  491  482  500  476  528  505  492  580  600  495  544  519 






























18  7  13 
P (100%)  41  0  0  46  1  50  18  0  0  18  7  13 
(-)Lottery  144  432  288  288  216  288  216  144  144  274  198  236 
Net Rev.  429  50  212  280  314  317  312  436  456  257  360  309 
  (384)  (384)  (384)  (384)  (384)  (384)  (384)  (384)  (384)  (384)  (384)  (384) 
Payoff  3878  3096  3430  3608  3628  3624  3624  3872  3912  3528  3758  3630 
                         
Note:  ‘M/F’  refers  to  the  number  of  male/female  subjects,  ‘Declared’  denotes  total  voluntary 
contributions (max. 600), ‘TC-Ratio’ denotes total compliance ratio, which is measured as the number of 
full  compliances  (frequency  of  20)  over  the  total  number  of  tax  payments  per  block  (i.e.  5·6=30), 
‘Enforced’ denotes reimbursements enforced due to an audit, ‘Checked’ denotes the number of checked or 
audited subjects, ‘P’ denotes penalty payments due to an audit, ‘Lottery’ denotes lottery winnings, and 
‘Net Rev.’ denotes the net income of the government (declared+enforced+penalty[-lottery]) and figures in 
parentheses denote expected net revenue per block according to section four (for example, first block all 
sessions, 90 is calculated from: 100-97=3, 3·5·6=90), ‘Payoff’ denotes total payoff per block.   
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Table 3: Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test on Declared and TC-Ratio 
 
Session  C1  C2  C3  C4  C5  M1  M2  M3  M4  PRS   p-value 
                       
Declared                       
(#2 - #1)  61  291  158  168  -84  44  174  127  163  C  M    
Rank  1  5  3  4  (2)  1  4  2  3  13  10  0.0938 / 0.0625 
Rank   2  9  5  7  (3)  1  8  4  6  42  0.0098 
(#3 - #2)  81  -50  5  56  154  65  23  176  13  C  M   
Rank  4  (2)  1  3  5  3  2  4  1  13  10  0.0938 / 0.0625 
Rank  7  (4)  1  5  8  6  3  9  2  41  0.0137 
(#3 - #1)  142  241  163  224  70  109  197  303  176  C  M   
Rank  2  5  3  4  1  1  3  4  2  15  10  0.0313 / 0.0625 
Rank  3  8  4  7  1  2  6  9  5  45  0.0020 
                       
TC-Ratio                       
(#2 - #1)  10  21  20  14  12  11  14  18  13  C    M   
Rank  1  5  4  3  2  1  3  4  2  15  10  0.0313 / 0.0625 
Rank   1  9  8  5.5  3  2  5.5  7  4  45  0.0020 
(#3 - #2)  10  -2  1  4  6  2  3  10  2  C   M   
Rank  5  (2)  1  3  4  1.5  3  4  1.5  13  10  0.0938 / 0.0625 
Rank  8.5  (3)  1  6  7  3  5  8.5  3  42  0.0098 
(#3 - #1)  20  19  21  18  18  13  17  28  15  C   M   
Rank  4  3  5  1.5  1.5  1  3  4  2  15  10  0.0313 / 0.0625 
Rank  7  6  8  4.5  4.5  1  3  9  2  45  0.0020 
Note: #2-#1, #3-#2, and #3-#1 denote the difference of the relevant values in the two blocks under 
consideration, parenthesis denote negative ranks, PRS denotes the sum of the positive ranks and 
p-values are taken from Siegel and Castellan (1985, p. 332). With respect to the TC-Ratio 
differences are based on the nominators (see Table 2) only as the denominators are identical 
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Table 4: Gender Specific Results per Block and Session for Chemnitz and Montpellier  
 
     
                   Chemnitz     Montpellier  Average 
  C1  C2  C3  C4  C5  M1  M2  M3   M4  CA  MA  TA 
(M/F)  (2/3)  (2/3)  (2/3)  (3/2)  (-/5)  (2/3)  (1/4)  (3/2)  (1/4)  (9/16)  (7/13)  (16/29) 
#1 Block                         
Males  2  2  2  3  -  2  1  3  1  9  7  16 
Declared  67  15  59  29  -  50  33  64  20  41  49  44 
TC-Ratio  0/12  0/12  1/12  1/18  -  0/12  0/6  1/18  1/6  -  -  - 
Enforced  8  10  14  60  -  24  10  1  20  -  -  - 
P (50%)  4  5  7  30  -  12  5  0.5  10  -  -  - 
Net Rev.  145  45  139  176  -  135  48  192.5  50  56  61  58 
Payoff  1,491  1,480  1,504  2,245  -  1,620  772  2,163  822  747  768  756 
                         
#1 Block                         
Females  3  3  3  2  5  3  4  2  4  16  13  29 
Declared  72  70  73  83  92  99  66  43  101  79  81  80 
TC-Ratio  0/18  4/18  2/18  0/12  4/30  11/18  7/24  0/12  14/24  -  -  - 
Enforced  10  10  5  0  10  15  44  20  0  -  -  - 
P (50%)  5  5  2.5  0  5  7.5  22  10  0  -  -  - 
Net Rev.  231  226  227  166  473  320  328  116  404  83  90  86 
Payoff  2,220  2,062  2,225  1,445  3,941  2,299  2,910  1,454  3,118  743  752  747 
                         
#2 Block                         
Males  2  2  2  3  -  2  1  3  1  9  7  16 
Declared  82  120  95  70  -  40  90  85  120  89  78  84 
TC-Ratio  5/12  12/12  9/12  10/18  -  4/12  3/6  12/18  6/6  -  -  - 
Enforced  8  0  0  20  -  0  10  20  0  -  -  - 
P (100%)  4  0  0  10  -  0  5  10  0  -  -  - 
(-)Lottery  -  -  -  144  -  -  -  144  72  -  -  - 
Net Rev.  175  240  190  96  -  80  105  140  48  78  53  67 
Payoff  1,487  1,431  1,367  2,250  -  1,550  718  2,160  816  726  749  736 
                         
#2 Block                         
Females  3  3  3  2  5  3  4  2  4  16  13  29 
Declared  82  97  102  105  75  120  95  75  117  89  104  96 
TC-Ratio  5/18  13/18  14/18  5/12  16/30  18/18  18/24  7/12  22/24  -  -  - 
Enforced  36  3  0  0  60  0  10  20  0  -  -  - 
P (100%)  18  1.5  0  0  30  0  5  10  0  -  -  - 
(-)Lottery  72  144  216  -  216  72  144  72  72  -  -  - 
Net Rev.  229  153  89  210  248  288  364  108  395  58  89  72 
Payoff  2,048  2,360  2,262  1,361  3,518  2,156  3,040  1,426  3,068  722  745  732 
                         
#3 Block                         
Males  2  2  2  3  -  2  1  3  1  9  7  16 
Declared  86  105  80  83  -  80  120  113  120  88  106  96 
TC-Ratio  6/12  10/12  8/12  11/18  -  8/12  6/6  17/18  6/6  -  -  - 
Enforced  15  0  0  40  -  40  0  0  0  -  -  - 
P (100%)  15  0  0  40  -  40  0  0  0  -  -  -   32 
(-)Lottery  -  216  144  72  -  72  -  144  -  -  -  - 
Net Rev.  201  -6  16  258  -  168  120  196  120  52  86  67 
Payoff  1,504  1266  1441  2075  -  1,412  667  2,389  754  698  746  719 
                         
#3 Block                         
Females  3  3  3  2  5  3  4  2  4  16  13  29 
Declared  107  91  113  113  106  115  93  120  120  106  111  108 
TC-Ratio  14/18  13/18  16/18  8/12  22/30  16/18  18/24  12/12  24/24  -  -  - 
Enforced  26  0  0  6  1  10  18  0  0  -  -  - 
P (100%)  26  0  0  6  1  10  18  0  0  -  -  - 
(-)Lottery  144  216  144  216  216  216  216  -  144  -  -  - 
Net Rev.  230  56  196  10  314  149  192  240  336  50  69  59 
Payoff  2,324  1,830  1,989  1,533  3,628  2,212  2,957  1,483  3,158  707  755  728 
                         
Note: ‘M/F’ refers to the number of male and female subjects, ‘Declared’ denotes voluntary contributions 
per capita and block of 6 rounds for either males or females, multiplying these figures with the number of 
males and females, respectively, and adding the values for males and females gives the corresponding 
values in Table 2, ‘TC-Ratio’ denotes total compliance ratio, which is measured as the number of full 
compliances (i.e., 20 tokens given) over the total number of tax payments per block for males and females, 
‘Enforced’ denotes reimbursements enforced due to an audit, ‘Penalty’ denotes penalty payments due to 
an audit, ‘Lottery’ denotes lottery winnings, and ‘Net Rev.’ denotes the net income of the government per 
block from either males or females, adding up of the male and female figures gives the corresponding 
value in Table 2,‘Payoff’ denotes  payoff per block for males and females, again adding up yields relevant 
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Table 5: Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test on Declared and TC-Ratio for Males and Females 
 
                       
Session  C1  C2  C3  C4  C5  M1  M2  M3  M4   PRS  p-value 
                       
Males/Declared                     
(#2 - #1)  15  105  36  41  -  -10  57  21  100  C   M   
Rank  1  4  2  3  -  (1)  3  2  4  10  9  0.0625/0.125 
Rank  2  8  4  5  -  (1)  6  3  7  35  0.0078 
(#3 - #2)  4  -15  -15  13  -  40  30  28  0  C   M   
Rank  1  (3.5)  (3.5)  2  -  3  2  1  -  3    6  >0.5/0.125 
Rank  1  (3.5)  (3.5)  2  -  7  6  5  -  21  0.1484 
(#3 - #1)  19  90  21  54  -  30  87  49  100  C   M   
Rank  1  4  2  3  -  1  3  2  4  10 10  0.0625/0.0625 
Rank  1  7  2  5  -  3  6  4  8  36  0.0039 
                       
Females/Declared                     
(#2 - #1)  10  27  29  22  -17  21  29  32  16  C   M   
Rank  1  4  5  3  (2)  2  3  4  1  13 10  0.0938/0.0625 
Rank  1  6  7.5  5  (3)  4  7.5  9  2  42  0.0098 
(#3 - #2)  25  -6  11  8  31  -5  -2  55  3  C   M   
Rank  4  (1)  3  2  5  (3)  (1)  4  2  14  6  0.0625/0.4375 
Rank  7  (4)  6  5  8  (3)  (1)  9  2  37  0.0488 
(#3 - #1)  35  21  40  30  14  16  27  77  19  C   M   
Rank  4  2  5  3  1  1  3  4  2  15 10  0.0313/0.0625 
Rank  7  4  8  6  1  2  5  9  3  45  0.0020 
                       
Males/TC-Ratio                     
(#2 - #1)  0.42  1  0.67  0.5  -  0.33  0.5  0.61  0.83  C   M   
Rank  1  4  3  2  -  1  2  3  4  10 10  0.0625/0.0625 
Rank  2  8  6  3.5  -  1  3.5  5  7  36  0.0039 
(#3 - #2)  0.08  -0.2  -0.1  0.05  -  0.33  0.5  0.28  0  C   M   
Rank  2.5  (4)  (2.5)  1  -  2  3  1  -  3.5  6  >0.5/0.125 
Rank  2.5  (4)  (2.5)  1  -  6  7  5  -  21.5  0.1484 
(#3 - #1)  0.5  0.83  0.58  0.55  -  0.67  1  0.89  0.83  C   M   
Rank  1  4  3  2  -  1  4  3  2  10 10  0.0625/0.0625 
Rank  1  5.5  3  2  -  4  8  7  5.5  36  0.0039 
                       
Females/TC-Ratio                     
(#2 - #1)  0.28  0.5  0.67  0.42  0.4  0.39  0.46  0.58  0.33  C   M   
Rank  1  4  5  3  2  2  3  4  1  15 10  0.0313/0.0625 
Rank  1  7  9  5  4  3  6  8  2  45  0.0020 
(#3 - #2)  0.5  0  0.11  0.25  0.2  -0.1    0  0.42  0.08  C   M   
Rank  4  -  1  3  2  (2)  -  3  1  10  4  0.0625/>0.5 
Rank  7  -  2.5  5  4  (2.5)  -  6  1  25.5  0.0391 
(#3 - #1)  0.78  0.5  0.78  0.67  0.6  0.28  0.46  1  0.42  C   M   
Rank  4.5  1  4.5  3  2  1  3  4  2  15 10  0.0313/0.0625 
Rank  7.5  4  7.5  6  5  1  3  9  2  45  0.0020 
                       
Note:#2-#1, #3-#2, and #3-#1 denote the difference of the relevant values in the two blocks under 
consideration, parenthesis denote negative ranks, PRS denotes the sum of the positive ranks and 
p-values are taken from Siegel and Castellan (1985, p. 332). With respect to the TC-Ratio   34 
differences are here based on the actual ratio (see Table 2) because the number of males and 
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Appendix 
 
French and German translations of the following instructions were used for the experiment.  
 
Instructions 
In this experiment you are an agent in a model economy. You will receive in each round 100 
units of a good (column B in your earnings record sheet). A generally accepted ruling says 
that you are required to give 20 units to an institution which is part of the model economy 
(column C). However, in principle, each agent can freely choose the amount which he or she 
gives to the institution from the integer interval [0, 20], with: {0, 1, 2, …, 18, 19, 20}.  
Yet, the institution will monitor compliance with the ruling at random. In case that a 
random check reveals that less then 20 units have been given, the difference and a penalty is 
due. The penalty is half of the difference that is due. Example: Required 20; actually given 
16; Difference due 4; penalty due 2; total 22. 
 
Monitoring Modus:   
After each round the institution decides by tossing a coin whether or not a check will be 
carried out or not. If the coin shows its face value (number) the check will be carried out, 
otherwise there is no check.  
If a check is carried out, one card will be drawn from a properly mixed stack of cards with 
the numbers 1 to 5. The agent associated with the number drawn will be checked. All other 




The  ‘calculator’  will  summarize  all  individual  contributions,  including  differences  and 
penalties due. The sum will be divided by the number of players. This result will be tripled. 
The resulting amount will be paid to each agent and put into column (F) on your earnings 
record sheet.  
 
Your Job 
It is your job to maximize your total earnings (column G) over all rounds of the block.  
We will play 6 rounds one after the other. Thereafter you will receive new instructions 
and we play another block of 6 rounds. Thereafter, you receive new instructions and a third 
block of 6 rounds will be played. Thereafter the experiment ends.  
After  the  experiment  one  agent  will  be  determined  at  random  by  drawing  a  card  as 
described above. This agent will then receive 1% of his or her total earnings in Euro cash (this 
will be are a two digit amount of Euro). In addition, every agent will receive 5 Euro in cash. 
 
Procedure 
At  the  beginning  of  a  round  you  need  to  decide  which  amount  you  want  to  give  to  the 
institution. You need to write this amount in column C on your earnings record sheet and 
simultaneously on your submission form. Put your submission form face down in front of you 
and write your ID number on the back of your form. 
Thereafter the institution determines whether or not a check will be carried out and who 
will be checked. The instructor collects the submission forms face down and passes them on 
to the institution. The institution then carries out the check and notes on the submission form 
any difference due and any penalty due, if applicable.  
The institution then passes all submission forms on to the calculator, who determines the 
payoff and announces it. Thereafter a new round begins.  
Do you have any questions?   36 
Instructions (#2 Block)  
 
All instructions given in the first block remain valid.   
The only change is that  you can now voluntarily opt for a higher number of random 
checks. If you do opt for a higher number of random checks then please mark “Alpha” on 
your earnings record sheet and on your submission form (in addition, also at the back of your 
submission form). 
If you do NOT opt for a higher number of random checks then please mark “Beta” on 
your earnings record sheet and on your submission form (in addition, also at the back of your 
submission form). 
For both groups „Alpha“ and „Beta“ a coin will now be tossed separately. Again, if the 
coin shows its face value (number) a check will be carried out in the relevant group, otherwise 
there will be no check.  
For the „Alpha-Group“, in case that a check is carried out, two cards will be drawn from 
a properly mixed stack which contains only cards with the numbers of those agents who have 
jointed the „Alpha-Group“. In case that the „Alpha-Group“ has just one member, this member 
will be checked.  
In addition, the actually checked members of the “Alpha-Group” (i.e. one or two) take 
part in a lottery. In this lottery 72 units of the good are at stake. Again, the lottery winner is 
drawn from a properly mixed stack of cards which contains only cards with the numbers of 
“Alpha-Group” members that have been checked (i.e. one or two cards). However, the winner 
receives the 72 units only if he or she has complied with the rule and has consequently given 
20 units to the institution, and no penalty was due. In case that the „Alpha-Group“ has just 
one  member,  this  member  will  be  checked  and,  provided  that  no  penalty  was  due,  this 
member receives the lottery winning.  
If the lottery has actually been awarded, the winning (72 units) will be deducted during 
the calculation of the payoff. That is, it reduces the sum that will be divided by the number of 
players.  
For the „Beta-Group”, in case of a check, only one card will be drawn from a stack of 
cards that contains the ID-numbers of all members of the “Beta-Group”. All members of the 
“Beta-Group” are excluded from the lottery.  
The monitoring procedure is otherwise the same as in the first block.  
 
Do you have any questions? 
 
Instructions (#3 Block)  
 
All instructions given in the second block remain valid. The only change now consists of an 
increase of the penalty. Now the penalty is exactly as high as the difference that is due. The 
higher penalty applies to both the „Alpha“- and the „Beta“-Group. The monitoring procedure 
remains the same as before.  
 
Do you have any questions? 
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